David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):646-654 (2004)
The conscious feeling of exercising ‘free-will’ is fundamental to our sense of self. However, in some psychopathological conditions actions may be experienced as involuntary or unwilled. We have used suggestion in hypnosis to create the experience of involuntariness in normal participants. We compared a voluntary finger movement, a passive movement and a voluntary movement suggested by hypnosis to be ‘involuntary.’ Hypnosis itself had no effect on the subjective experience of voluntariness associated with willed movements and passive movements or on time estimations of their occurrence. However, subjective time estimates of a hypnotically-suggested, ‘involuntary’ finger movement were more similar to those for passive movements than for voluntary movements. The experience of anomalous control is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the normal conscious experience of a similar act produced intentionally. The experience of anomalous control may be produced either by pathology, or, in our case, by suggestion
|Keywords||*Consciousness States *Motor Processes *Self Perception *Volition|
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Martin Brüne, Cumhur Tas, Julia Wischniewski, Anna Welpinghus, Christine Heinisch & Albert Newen (2012). Hypnotic Ingroup–Outgroup Suggestion Influences Economic Decision-Making in an Ultimatum Game. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):939-946.
David A. Oakley & Peter W. Halligan (2009). Hypnotic Suggestion and Cognitive Neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (6):264-270.
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