Hard cases: A procedural approach
Artificial Intelligence and Law 2 (2):113-167 (1993)
| Abstract | Much work on legal knowledge systems treats legal reasoning as arguments that lead from a description of the law and the facts of a case, to the legal conclusion for the case. The reasoning steps of the inference engine parallel the logical steps by means of which the legal conclusion is derived from the factual and legal premises. In short, the relation between the input and the output of a legal inference engine is a logical one. The truth of the conclusion only depends on the premises, and is independent of the argument that leads to the conclusion.This paper opposes the logical approach, and defends a procedural approach to legal reasoning. Legal conclusions are not true or false independent of the reasoning process that ended in these conclusions. In critical cases this reasoning process consists of an adversarial procedure in which several parties are involved. The course of the argument determines whether the conclusion is true or false. The phenomenon of hard cases is used to demonstrate this essential procedural nature of legal reasoning. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Aldo Schiavello (2011). Neil MacCormick's Second Thoughts on Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. A Defence of the Original View. Ratio Juris 24 (2):140-155.
Pauline Westerman (2010). Arguing About Goals: The Diminishing Scope of Legal Reasoning. Argumentation 24 (2):211-226.
Cameron Stewart (2011). Futility Determination as a Process: Problems with Medical Sovereignty, Legal Issues and the Strengths and Weakness of the Procedural Approach. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (2):155-163.
Katie Atkinson & Trevor Bench-Capon (2005). Legal Case-Based Reasoning as Practical Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 13 (1):93-131.
F. Atria (1999). Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory Revisited. Law and Philosophy 18 (5):537-577.
H. Prakken & G. Sartor (1996). A Dialectical Model of Assessing Conflicting Arguments in Legal Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (3-4):331-368.
Jaap Hage (1996). A Theory of Legal Reasoning and a Logic to Match. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (3-4):199-273.
Carole D. Hafner & Donald H. Berman (2002). The Role of Context in Case-Based Legal Reasoning: Teleological, Temporal, and Procedural. Artificial Intelligence and Law 10 (1-3).
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads5 ( #160,483 of 549,198 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,198 )How can I increase my downloads? |

