Hedonism and the variety of goodness

Utilitas 22 (2):148-170 (2010)
Abstract
This article defends the project of giving a single pleasure-based account of goodness against what may seem a powerful challenge. Aristotle, Peter Geach and Judith Thomson have argued that there is no such thing as simply being good; there is only (for example) being a good knife or a good painting (Geach), being serene or good to eat (Thomson), or being good in essence or in qualities (Aristotle). But I argue that these philosophersgoodgoodknife’
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References found in this work BETA
P. T. Geach (1956). Good and Evil. Analysis 17 (2):33 - 42.
Amartya Sen (1982). Rights and Agency. Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1):3-39.

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