Potential infinite models and ontologically neutral logic
Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (1):79-96 (2001)
| Abstract | The paper begins with a more carefully stated version of ontologically neutral (ON) logic, originally introduced in (Hailperin, 1997). A non-infinitistic semantics which includes a definition of potential infinite validity follows. It is shown, without appeal to the actual infinite, that this notion provides a necessary and sufficient condition for provability in ON logic. | |||||||||
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Andreja Prijatelj (1996). Bounded Contraction and Gentzen-Style Formulation of Łukasiewicz Logics. Studia Logica 57 (2-3):437 - 456.
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Stefano Aguzzoli & Agata Ciabattoni (2000). Finiteness in Infinite-Valued Łukasiewicz Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (1):5-29.
Don Lodzinski (1995). Empty Time and the Eternality of God. Religious Studies 31 (2):187 - 195.
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Theodore Hailperin (1987). Infinite Truth-Functional Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 29 (1):28-33.
Theodore Hailperin (1992). Herbrand Semantics, the Potential Infinite, and Ontology-Free Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (1):69-90.
Theodore Hailperin (1997). Ontologically Neutral Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 18 (4):185-200.
Theodore Hailperin (2011). Logic Semantics with the Potential Infinite. History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (2):145-159.
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