Active control, agent-causation and free action

Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148 (2004)
Abstract
Key elements of Randolph Clarke's libertarian account of freedom that requires both agent-causation and non-deterministic event-causation in the production of free action is assessed with an eye toward determining whether agent-causal accounts can accommodate the truth of judgments of moral obligation
Keywords Agent  Causation  Event  Freedom  Libertarian  Metaphysics  Moral Obligation  Clarke, R
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Neil Levy (2009). Luck and History-Sensitive Compatibilism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):237-251.
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