A conundrum concerning creation

Sophia 48 (1):1-14 (2009)
Abstract
In this paper, I expose a conundrum regarding divine creation as Leibniz conceives of such creation. What energizes the conundrum is that the concept of omnibenevolence—“consequential omnibenevolence”—that the Leibnizian argument for the view that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds presupposes, appears to sanction the conclusion that God has no practical reasons to create the actual world.
Keywords Best possible world  Consequentialism  Moral obligation  Optimal world  Omnibenevolence  Practical reason
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,350
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Robert Merrihew Adams (1972). Must God Create the Best? Philosophical Review 81 (3):317-332.
Ishtiyaque Haji (1994). Consequential Omnibenevolence. Grazer Philosophische Studien 47:207-222.
Joshua Hoffman (1979). Can God Do Evil? Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):213-220.

View all 11 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

15 ( #104,422 of 1,096,760 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #273,068 of 1,096,760 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.