Authentic Springs of Action and Obligation

Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):239 - 261 (2008)
Abstract
What is the connection between action that is caused by inauthentic antecedent springs of action, such as surreptitiously engineered-in desires and beliefs, and moral obligation? If, for example, an agent performs an action that derives from such antecedent springs can it be that the agent is not obligated to perform this action owing to the inauthenticity of its causal antecedents? I defend an affirmative response, assuming that we morally ought to bring about the states of affairs that occur in the intrinsically best worlds accessible to us and that a version of attitudinal hedonism is the axiology for ranking worlds
Keywords Authenticity  Freedom  Hard incompatibilism  Hedonism  Obligation
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References found in this work BETA
Geoffrey Cupit (1996). Desert and Responsibility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):83 - 99.
Fred Feldman (2000). Basic Intrinsic Value. Philosophical Studies 99 (3):319-346.

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