Disenabling Levy's Frankfurt-style enabling cases
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):400-414 (2011)
| Abstract | Recently, Neil Levy has proposed that an agent can acquire freedom-relevant agential abilities by virtue of the conditions in which she finds herself, and in this way, can be thought of as partially constituted by those conditions. This can be so even if the agent is completely ignorant of the relevant environmental conditions, and even if these conditions play no causal role in what the agent does. Drawing upon these resources, Levy argues that Frankfurt-style examples are not cogent. In this paper, we explain why his argument fails | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesNeil Levy (2012). Capacities and Counterfactuals: A Reply to Haji and McKenna. Dialectica 66 (4):607-620.
Katarzyna Paprzycka (2002). Flickers of Freedom and Frankfurt-Style Cases in the Light of the New Incompatibilism of the Stit Theory. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:553-565.
Gerald K. Harrison (2004). The Principle of Avoidable Blame. Ethic@ 3 (1):37-46.
Maria Alvarez (2009). Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
John Martin Fischer (2007). The Importance of Frankfurt-Style Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):464–471.
Ishtiyaque Haji (1999). Indeterminism and Frankfurt-Type Examples. Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.
Eric Funkhouser (2009). Frankfurt Cases and Overdetermination. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 341-369.
Gerald K. Harrison (2006). Frankfurt-Style Cases and Improbable Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):399 - 406.
Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield (2007). Finking Frankfurt. Philosophical Studies 135 (3):363--74.
Justin A. Capes (2010). The W-Defense. Philosophical Studies 150:61-77.
Alfred R. Mele (2000). Responsibility and Freedom: The Challenge of Frankfurt-Style-Cases. In M. Betzler & B. Guckes (eds.), Autonomes Handeln: Beitrage Zur Philosophie von Harry G. Frankfurt. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
John Davenport (2006). The Deliberative Relevance of Refraining From Deciding: A Response to McKenna and Pereboom. Acta Analytica 21 (4).
Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 152:189–207.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-08-05Total downloads54 ( #18,844 of 549,124 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,124 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
