Foreknowledge, freedom, and obligation

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):321-339 (2005)
: A vital presupposition of an influential argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and libertarian free action is that free action requires alternative possibilities. A recent, noteworthy challenge to this presupposition invokes a “Divine Frankfurt‐type example”: God's foreknowledge of one's future actions prevents one from doing otherwise without having any responsibility‐undermining effect on one's actions. First, I explain why features of God's omniscience cast doubt on this Frankfurtian response. Second, even if this appraisal is mistaken, I argue that divine foreknowledge is irreconcilable with moral obligation if such foreknowledge eliminates alternatives
Keywords Compatibilism  Foreknowledge  Freedom  Metaphysics  Obligation
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00230.x
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