Indeterminism and Frankfurt-type examples
Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58 (1999)
| Abstract | I assess Robert Kane's view that global Frankfurt-type cases don't show that freedom to do otherwise is never required for moral responsibility. I first adumbrate Kane's indeterminist account of free will.This will help us grasp Kane's notion of ultimate responsibility, and his claim that in a global Frankfurt-type case, the counterfactual intervener could not control all of the relevant agent's actions in the Frankfurt manner, and some of those actions would be such that the agent could have done otherwise. Appealing to considerations of responsibility and luck, I then show that the global cases survive Kane's objections. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Free Will Indeterminism Metaphysics Moral Responsibility Frankfurt, H Kane, R | |||||||||
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