Intrinsic value, alternative possibilities, and reason

Journal of Ethics 14 (2):149-171 (2010)
I address three issues in this paper: first, just as many have thought that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of judgments of moral responsibility, is there reason to think that the truth of judgments of intrinsic value also presupposes our having alternatives? Second, if there is this sort of requirement for the truth of judgments of intrinsic value, is there an analogous requirement for the truth of judgments of moral obligation on the supposition that obligation supervenes on goodness? Third, if the truth of judgments of intrinsic value and those of moral obligation do presuppose our having access to alternatives, what should be said about whether determinism imperils the truth of such judgments? I defend an affirmative answer to the first question, a more guarded answer to the second, and a yet more restrained answer to the third
Keywords Alternative possibilities  Determinism  Intrinsic value  Reasons  Semi-compatibilism
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Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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