David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (1998)
This book explores the epistemic or knowledge requirement of moral responsibility. Haji argues that an agent can be blamed (or praised) only if the agent harbors a belief that the action in question is wrong (or right or obligatory). Defending the importance of an "authenticity" condition when evaluating moral responsibility, Haji holds that one cannot be morally responsible for an action unless the action issues from sources (like desires or beliefs) that are truly the agent's own. Engaging crucial arguments in moral theory to elaborate his views on moral responsibility, Haji addresses as well fascinating, underexamined topics such as assigning blame across an intercultural gap and the relevance of unconscious or dream thoughts when evaluating responsibility.
|Keywords||Ethics Free will and determinism Responsibility|
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|Call number||BJ1461.H26 1998|
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Citations of this work BETA
Neil Levy & Michael McKenna (2009). Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
Michael McKenna (2008). Frankfurt's Argument Against Alternative Possibilities: Looking Beyond the Examples. Noûs 42 (4):770-793.
Peter B. M. Vranas (2007). I Ought, Therefore I Can. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167 - 216.
Helen Steward (2009). Fairness, Agency and the Flicker of Freedom. Noûs 43 (1):64 - 93.
John Martin Fischer (2003). ‘Ought-Implies-Can’, Causal Determinism and Moral Responsibility. Analysis 63 (279):244–250.
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