David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Neuroethics 3 (2):135-150 (2010)
I argue that emotional sensitivity (or insensitivity) has a marked negative influence on ethical perception. Diminished capacities of ethical perception, in turn, mitigate what we are morally responsible for while lack of such capacities may altogether eradicate responsibility. Impairment in ethical perception affects responsibility by affecting either recognition of or reactivity to moral reasons. It follows that emotional insensitivity (together with its attendant impairment in ethical perception) bears saliently on moral responsibility. Since one distinguishing mark of the psychopath is emotional insensitivity, emotional insensitivity and the resulting impairment in moral perception either excuses the psychopath from moral culpability or moderates the degree to which he is culpable.
|Keywords||Emotional depravity Ethical perception Moral culpability Psychopathy Salient alternatives|
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Citations of this work BETA
Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess (2016). Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):n/a-n/a.
Nicole A. Vincent (2015). A Compatibilist Theory of Legal Responsibility. Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (3):477-498.
Nicole A. Vincent (2014). Neurolaw and Direct Brain Interventions. Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):43-50.
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