David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):179 – 201 (2006)
Famed so-called 'Frankfurt-type examples' have been invoked to cast doubt on the principle that a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Many who disagree that the examples are successful in this respect argue that these examples succumb to a deadly dilemma. I uncover and assess libertarian assumptions upon which the 'dilemma objection' is based. On exposing these assumptions, it becomes clear that various sorts of libertarian are no longer entitled to one or the other horns of the dilemma.
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (1995). Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Citations of this work BETA
Ishtiyaque Haji (2012). Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 16 (2):175-209.
Joseph Keim Campbell (2008). New Essays on the Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):193 - 201.
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