The principle of alternate possibilities and a defeated dilemma
Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):179 – 201 (2006)
| Abstract | Famed so-called 'Frankfurt-type examples' have been invoked to cast doubt on the principle that a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Many who disagree that the examples are successful in this respect argue that these examples succumb to a deadly dilemma. I uncover and assess libertarian assumptions upon which the 'dilemma objection' is based. On exposing these assumptions, it becomes clear that various sorts of libertarian are no longer entitled to one or the other horns of the dilemma. | |||||||||
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