David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Inquiry 41 (1):21 – 43 (1998)
Two kinds of intrinsically valuable entities are distinguished - those that are ends-in- themselves (and therefore sacred) and those that are intrinsically good. It is suggested that it is the individual rather than the group that is sacred in the primary sense. To be sacred or an end-in-itself implies that the sacred entity must not be replaced by a potential entity even if more good can be promoted by doing so. It is suggested that only entities that have an irreducible consciousness should be candidates for the sacred in the primary sense. If so, it would follow that groups are not sacred in the primary sense unless perhaps one regards them as unitary beings. It is argued that though groups have rights that are not reducible to the rights of individuals, this is consistent with the view that the ultimate justification of these rights is provided by an appeal to the interests of the relevant individuals; groups can be derivatively sacred. Activities of collectives can sometimes be intrinsically good, and such considerations, too, would be relevant to deciding upon which collectives should be retained and which modified or replaced.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Miodrag A. Jovanović (2010). Are There Universal Collective Rights? Human Rights Review 11 (1):17-44.
Similar books and articles
Robert Merrihew Adams (1995). Moral Horror and the Sacred. Journal of Religious Ethics 23 (2):201 - 224.
Richard A. Watson (1979). Self-Consciousness and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals and Nature. Environmental Ethics 1 (2):99-129.
Martha Nussbaum (2003). The Complexity of Groups: A Comment on Jorge Valadez. Philosophy and Social Criticism 29 (1):57-69.
Kwame Anthony Appiah (2011). “Group Rights” and Racial Affirmative Action. Journal of Ethics 15 (3):265-280.
Bill Wringe (2010). Global Obligations and the Agency Objection. Ratio 23 (2):217-231.
E. Glen Weyl (2009). Whose Rights? A Critique of Individual Agency as the Basis of Rights. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (2):139-171.
Jeff Spinner‐Halev (2001). The Universal Pretensions of Cultural Rights Arguments. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 4 (2):1-25.
Anthony Ellis (2005). Minority Rights and the Preservation of Languages. Philosophy 80 (2):199-217.
Erol Kuyurtar (2007). Are Cultural Group Rights Against Individual Rights? The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 3:51-59.
Adina Preda (2012). Group Rights and Group Agency. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):229-254.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads19 ( #94,211 of 1,102,059 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #192,049 of 1,102,059 )
How can I increase my downloads?