David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Social Epistemology 21 (3):249 – 266 (2007)
Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as a refinement of the ordinary language concept of belief, and it may be useful in understanding the nature of epistemic justification and classifying various types of epistemic subjects.
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References found in this work BETA
Edmund Gettier (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Raimo Tuomela (1995). The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions. Stanford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
András Szigeti (2015). Why Change the Subject? On Collective Epistemic Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):843-864.
Kristina Rolin (2010). Group Justification in Science. Episteme 7 (3):215-231.
Silvia Tossut (2014). Membership and Knowledge. Scientific Research as a Group Activity. Episteme 11 (3):349-367.
Miika Vähämaa (2013). Groups as Epistemic Communities: Social Forces and Affect as Antecedents to Knowledge. Social Epistemology 27 (1):3 - 20.
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