David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):143-161 (2012)
In this paper, I argue that there is a sceptical argument against the senses advanced by Hume that forms a decisive objection to the Metaphysically Realist interpretations of his philosophy – such as the different naturalist and New Humean readings. Hume presents this argument, apparently starting with the primary/secondary qualities distinction, both in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 4, Section 4 (Of the modern philosophy) (1739) and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section 12 (Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy), paragraphs 15 to 16 (1748). The argument concludes with the contradiction between consistent reasoning (causal, in particular) and believing in the existence of Real (distinct and continued) entities. The problem with the Realist readings of Hume is that they attribute both to Hume. So their Hume is a self-reflectively inconsistent philosopher. I show that the various ways to avoid this problem do not work. Accordingly, this paper suggests a non-Realist interpretation of Hume's philosophy: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgment on Metaphysical Realism. As such, his philosophical attitude is neutral on the divide between materialism and idealism
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
John Locke (1995). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press.
E. J. Lowe (2005). The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. Oxford University Press.
David Hume (1739). Treatise on Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
Don Garrett (1996). Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
George Berkeley (1998). Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jani Hakkarainen (2012). Hume's Scepticism and Realism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):283-309.
P. J. E. Kail (2010). Précis of Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy. Hume Studies 36 (1):61-65.
Peter Millican (2009). Hume, Causal Realism, and Causal Science. Mind 118 (471):647-712.
Walter Ott (2009). What Can Causal Claims Mean? Philosophia 37 (3):459-470.
Aisling Crean (2010). Humean Humility. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy (Special Issue edited by Helen Beebee and Markus Schrenk) 13.
Peter Kail (2003). Conceivability and Modality in Hume: A Lemma in an Argument in Defense of Skeptical Realism. Hume Studies 29 (1):43--61.
Jon Charles Miller (2012). A Treatisevs.An Enquiry: Omissions and Distortions by the New Humeans. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (5):1015-1026.
Peter Lipton (2005). Waiting for Hume. In Marina Frasca-Spada & P. J. E. Kail (eds.), Impressions of Hume. Oxford University Press 59.
Fred Wilson (1984). Is Hume a Sceptic with Regard to Reason? Philosophy Research Archives 10:275-319.
Jani Hakkarainen (2011). Hume's Argument for the Ontological Independence of Simple Properties. Metaphysica 12 (2):197-212.
Angela Coventry (2006). Hume's Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation. Continuum Books.
David Hume (2007). A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical Edition. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2012-08-24
Total downloads31 ( #135,499 of 1,934,966 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #113,693 of 1,934,966 )
How can I increase my downloads?