Certainty and phenomenal states

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):57-72 (1994)
If we agree, along with Arnauld, Berkeley, Descartes, Hume, Leibniz, and others that our occurrent phenomenal states serve as sources of epistemic certainty for us, we need some explanation of this fact. Many contemporary writers, most notably Roderick Chisholm, maintain that there is something special about the phenomenal states themselves that allows our certain knowledge of them. I argue that Chisholm's view is both wrong and irreparable, and that the capacity of humans to know these states with certainty has to do with the contingent cognitive capacities and abilities people have.
Keywords Certainty  Consciousness  Epistemology  Knowledge  Hume
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.1994.10717359
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