Deliberation and the first person
| Abstract | Philosophers like Shoemaker and Burge argue that only self-conscious creatures can exercise rational control over their mental lives. In particular they urge that reflective rationality requires possession of the I-concept, the first person concept. These philosophers maintain that rational creatures like ourselves can exercise reflective control over belief as well as action. I agree that we have this sort of control over our actions and that practical freedom presupposes self-consciousness. But I deny that anything like this is true of belief. | |||||||||
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David Owens (2008). Deliberation and the First Person. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
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