David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3):469-487 (2009)
The question of whether knowledge is definable in terms of belief, which has played an important role in epistemology for the last 50 years, is studied here in the framework of epistemic and doxastic logics. Three notions of definability are considered: explicit definability, implicit definability, and reducibility, where explicit definability is equivalent to the combination of implicit definability and reducibility. It is shown that if knowledge satisfies any set of axioms contained in S5, then it cannot be explicitly defined in terms of belief. S5 knowledge can be implicitly defined by belief, but not reduced to it. On the other hand, S4.4 knowledge and weaker notions of knowledge cannot be implicitly defined by belief, but can be reduced to it by defining knowledge as true belief. It is also shown that S5 knowledge cannot be reduced to belief and justification, provided that there are no axioms that involve both belief and justification
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References found in this work BETA
William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.
A. J. Ayer (1956). The Problem of Knowledge. Harmondsworth.
Patrick Blackburn, Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema (2002). Modal Logic. Cambridge University Press.
Laurence BonJour & Ernest Sosa (2003). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Blackwell Pub..
Roderick M. Chisholm (1957). Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Lorenz Demey (2013). Contemporary Epistemic Logic and the Lockean Thesis. Foundations of Science 18 (4):599-610.
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