David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):524–539 (2003)
There are two main theories about the persistence of objects through time: endurantism and perdurantism. Endurantists hold that objects are three-dimensional, have only spatial parts, and wholly exist at each moment of their existence. Perdurantists hold that objects are four-dimensional, have temporal parts, and only partly exist at each moment of their existence. In this paper we argue that endurantism is poorly suited to describe the persistence of objects in a world governed by Special Relativity, and can accommodate a relativistic world only at a high price, one that we argue is not worth paying. Perdurantism, on the other hand, fits beautifully with our current scientific understanding of the world. Furthermore, we make this argument from implications of the Lorentz transformations, without appeals to geometrical interpretations, dimensional analogies, or auxillary premises like temporal eternalism.
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Thomas A. C. Reydon (2008). Species in Three and Four Dimensions. Synthese 164 (2):161 - 184.
Kristie Miller (2010). Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):567-593.
Cord Friebe (2008). Kant und die Spezielle Relativitätstheorie. Kant-Studien 99 (1):30-45.
Kristie Miller (2005). What is Metaphysical Equivalence? Philosophical Papers 34 (1):45-74.
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