David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind and Language 23 (4):426-456 (2008)
Abstract: A current debate in semantics and pragmatics is whether all contextual effects on truth-conditional content can be traced to logical form, or 'unarticulated constituents' can be supplied by the pragmatic process of free enrichment. In this paper, I defend the latter position. The main objection to this view is that free enrichment appears to overgenerate, not predicting where context cannot affect truth conditions, so that a systematic account is unlikely (Stanley, 2002a). I first examine the semantic alternative proposed by Stanley and others, which assumes extensive hidden structure acting as a linguistic trigger for pragmatic processes, so that all truth-conditional effects of context turn out to be instances of saturation. I show that there are cases of optional pragmatic contributions to the proposition expressed that cannot plausibly be accounted for in this way, and that advocates of this approach will therefore also have to appeal to free enrichment. The final section starts to address the question of how free enrichment is constrained: I argue that it involves only local development or adjustment of parts of logical form, any global developments being excluded by the requirement for the proposition expressed to provide an inferential warrant for the intended implications of the utterance.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
R. Carston (2002). Thoughts and Utterances. Blackwell.
Stephen C. Levinson (2000). Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature. MIT Press.
Stephen Neale (1990). Descriptions. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Andrew Peet (2015). Testimony, Pragmatics, and Plausible Deniability. Episteme 12 (1):29-51.
Paul Elbourne (2016). Incomplete Descriptions and Indistinguishable Participants. Natural Language Semantics 24 (1):1-43.
Francesco Pupa (2015). Impossible Interpretations, Impossible Demands. Linguistics and Philosophy 38 (3):269-287.
Wolfram Hinzen (2015). Nothing is Hidden: Contextualism and the Grammar‐Meaning Interface. Mind and Language 30 (3):259-291.
Esben Nedenskov Petersen (2014). Denying Knowledge. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):36-55.
Similar books and articles
Nicholas Asher & Daniel Bonevac (2005). Free Choice Permission is Strong Permission. Synthese 145 (3):303 - 323.
Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore (2002). Indexicality, Binding, Anaphora and A Priori Truth. Analysis 62 (4):271-81.
A. Bezuidenhout (1997). Pragmatics, Semantic Undetermination and the Referential/Attributive Distinction. Mind 106 (423):375-409.
François Recanati (2002). Unarticulated Constituents. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (3):299-345.
Robyn Carston, Enrichment and Loosening: Complementary Processes in Deriving the Proposition Expressed?
Eros Corazza & Jérôme Dokic (2012). Situated Minimalism Versus Free Enrichment. Synthese 184 (2):179-198.
Eros Corazza (2011). Unenriched Subsentential Illocutions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):560-582.
Luisa Martí (2006). Unarticulated Constituents Revisited. Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (2):135 - 166.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads96 ( #45,116 of 1,934,374 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #48,396 of 1,934,374 )
How can I increase my downloads?