|Abstract||The best-system account of scientific law proposes that laws and chances are to be defined in terms of systematic interpretation of all occurrences: L is a law and the chance of X is p just in case L and the chance p of X are consequences of the ideal axiom system for the totality of events. So, what seem to be further facts beyond the occurrences are just matters of the best way to interpret the totality of physical events. This paper proposes treating mentalistic concepts in a similar fashion: humans have consciousness in virtue of the fact that their brains’ best selfmonitoring, first-person interpretation of events involves consciousness. Apparent “further facts” about the mental realm are just matters of the brain’s native way to interpret itself. On this view, a philosopher’s “zombie” is just a normal human interpreted in a non-mentalistic way.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||No categories specified (fix it)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Pascal Massie (2003). The Irony of Chance. International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):15-28.
Carl Hoefer (2007). The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Sceptic's Guide to Objective Chance. Mind 116 (463):549-596.
John F. Halpin (1999). Nomic Necessity and Empiricism. Noûs 33 (4):630-643.
Carl Hoefer (2007). The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Sceptic's Guide to Objective Chance. Mind 116 (463):549 - 596.
John F. Halpin (1994). Legitimizing Chance: The Best-System Approach to Probabilistic Laws in Physical Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (3):317 – 338.
John F. Halpin (1998). Lewis, Thau, and Hall on Chance and the Best-System Account of Law. Philosophy of Science 65 (2):349-360.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads2 ( #232,265 of 548,999 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,999 )
How can I increase my downloads?