David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):525 – 535 (2008)
Many bodily sensations are connected quite closely with specific actions: itches with scratching, for example, and hunger with eating. Indeed, these connections have the feel of conceptual connections. With the exception of D. M. Armstrong, philosophers have largely neglected this aspect of bodily sensations. In this paper, I propose a theory of bodily sensations that explains these connections. The theory ascribes intentional content to bodily sensations but not, strictly speaking, representational content. Rather, the content of these sensations is an imperative: in the case of itches, 'Scratch!' The view avoids non-intentional qualia and hence accords with what could be called, generalizing Lycan slightly, the 'hegemony of intentionality'.
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Todd Ganson & Ben Bronner (2013). Visual Prominence and Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):405-418.
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Manolo Martínez (2011). Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.
Colin Klein (2012). Imperatives, Phantom Pains, and Hallucination by Presupposition. Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):917-928.
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