Moral Cognitivism

Philosophical Papers 31 (1):1-25 (2002)
Abstract The paper explicates a set of criteria the joint satisfaction of which is taken to qualify moral judgements as cognitive. The paper examines evidence that some moral judgements meet these criteria, and relates the resulting conception of moral judgements to ongoing controversies about cognitivism in ethics.
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DOI 10.1080/05568640209485092
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PhilPapers Archive Hallvard Lillehammer, Moral Cognitivism
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Neil Sinclair (2007). Propositional Clothing and Belief. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):342-362.

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