Naturalism and the problem of intentionality

Inquiry 32 (September):305-22 (1989)
To the memory of Ian McFetridge 1948?1988 The general concern of the essay is with the question of whether cognitive states can be accounted for in naturalistic (i.e. physicalist) terms. An argument is presented to the effect that they cannot. This turns on the idea that cognitive states involve modes of presentation the identity and individuation conditions of which are ineliminably both intentional and intensional and consequently they cannot be accounted for in terms of physico?causal powers. In connection with this the recent attempt by Robert Stalnaker to provide a naturalistic theory of intentionality is examined and rejected. In conclusion it is suggested that a more radical solution to the problem of how to relate cognitive and material phenomena may be available in the pluralistic naturalism of Aquinas (and, perhaps, Wittgenstein)
Keywords Cognition  Identity  Intentionality  Naturalism  Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00201748908602196
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,631
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Sydney Shoemaker (1987). Identity, Cause, and Mind. Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):227-232.
Peter Achinstein (1974). The Identity of Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (4):257 - 275.
John Haldane (1989). Brentano's Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 35:1-32.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

79 ( #57,720 of 1,938,743 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #71,476 of 1,938,743 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.