Self-deception and belief attribution

Synthese 101 (2):273-289 (1994)
  One of the most common views about self-deception ascribes contradictory beliefs to the self-deceiver. In this paper it is argued that this view (the contradiction strategy) is inconsistent with plausible common-sense principles of belief attribution. Other dubious assumptions made by contradiction strategists are also examined. It is concluded that the contradiction strategy is an inadequate account of self-deception. Two other well-known views — those of Robert Audi and Alfred Mele — are investigated and found wanting. A new theory of self-deception relying on an extension of Mark Johnston's subintentional mental tropisms is proposed and defended
Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Self-deception  Audi, R  Johnston, M  Mele, A
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DOI 10.1007/BF01064020
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References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (2010). Truth and Meaning. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Synthese. Routledge 304 - 323.
Saul A. Kripke (1979). A Puzzle About Belief. In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel 239--83.
Donald Davidson (1975). Thought and Talk. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Clarendon Press 1975--7.

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