David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 69 (3):325 - 340 (1986)
In his (1981) paper, Stalnaker has revised his old theory of conditionals and has given the revision an interesting defense. Indeed, Stalnaker shows that this new theory meets the standard objections put to the old. However, I argue that the revision runs into difficulties in the context of quantum mechanics: If Stalnaker's theory of the conditional is assumed, then from plausible assumptions certain Bell-like conflicts with experiment can be derived. This result, I go on to argue, is a good reason to reject Stalnaker's theory, at least for the quantum mechanical context.
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References found in this work BETA
David K. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
J. S. Bell (2004 ). On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox. In Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics. Cambridge University Press 14--21.
Robert Stalnaker (1968). Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell.
Robert C. Stalnaker (1981). A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle. In William Harper, Robert C. Stalnaker & Glenn Pearce (eds.), Ifs. Reidel 87-104.
Richmond Thomason & Anil Gupta (1980). A Theory of Conditionals in the Context of Branching Time. Philosophical Review 89 (1):65-90.
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