Structural equations and causation

Philosophical Studies 132 (1):109 - 136 (2007)
Structural equations have become increasingly popular in recent years as tools for understanding causation. But standard structural equations approaches to causation face deep problems. The most philosophically interesting of these consists in their failure to incorporate a distinction between default states of an object or system, and deviations therefrom. Exploring this problem, and how to fix it, helps to illuminate the central role this distinction plays in our causal thinking.
Keywords Causation  Counterfactuals  Causal models  Structural equations  Defaults  Deviants
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DOI 10.2307/25471849
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (2000). Causation as Influence. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
David Lewis (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.

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Rachael Briggs (2012). Interventionist Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.
Jim Woodward (2008). Response to Strevens. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):193-212.
Jim Woodward (2008). Response to Strevens. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):193-212.

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