Philosophy of Science Supplement 63 (3):125-33 (1996)
|Abstract||The standard adaptationist explanation of the presence of a sensory mechanism in an organism--that it detects properties useful to the organism--cannot be given for color vision. This is because colors do not exist. After arguing for this latter claim, I consider, but reject, nonadaptationist explanations. I conclude by proposing an explanation of how color vision could have adaptive value even though it does not detect properties in the environment|
|Keywords||Color Evolution Perception Science Vision|
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