Time for Change

Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):497-513 (2007)
Metaphysical theories of change incorporate substantive commitments to theories of persistence. The two most prominent classes of such theories are endurantism and perdurantism. Defenders of endurance-style accounts of change, such as Klein, Hinchliff, and Oderberg, do so through appeal to a priori intuitions about change. We argue that this methodology is understandable but mistaken—an adequate metaphysics of change must accommodate all experiences of change, not merely intuitions about a limited variety of cases. Once we examine additional experiences of change, particularly those in (special) relativistic circumstances, it becomes clear that only a perdurance account of change is adequate
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2007.tb00062.x
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References found in this work BETA
David S. Oderberg (2004). Temporal Parts and the Possibility of Change. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):686–708.
Gary S. Rosenkrantz (2005). An Epistemic Argument for Enduring Human Persons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):209-224.

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