David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207 (2012)
The present paper offers an analogical support for the use of rational intuition, namely, if we regard sense perception as a mental faculty that (in general) delivers justified beliefs, then we should treat intuition in the same manner. I will argue that both the cognitive marks of intuition and the role it traditionally plays in epistemology are strongly analogous to that of perception, and barring specific arguments to the contrary, we should treat rational intuition as a source of prima facie justified beliefs. There are two main arguments against the intuition-perception analogy that I will consider and find lacking. First is that while we do use perceptions as evidence to believe certain propositions, in fact no one ever does use intuition evidentially. The second argument, stemming from experimental philosophy, grants that philosophers do use intuitions evidentially, but this practice is fatally unlike that of perception, in that perception yields warranted beliefs and intuition does not.
|Keywords||intuition experimental philosophy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Joshua Alexander & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2007). Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):56–80.
Robert Audi (2008). Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475 - 492.
Michael A. Bishop (2005). Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. Oxford University Press.
Wesley Buckwalter, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols, N. Ángel Pinillos, Philip Robbins, Hagop Sarkissian, Chris Weigel & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2012). Experimental Philosophy. Oxford Bibliographies Online (1):81-92.
E. Conee & R. Feldman (1998). The Generality Problem for Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 89 (1):1-29.
Citations of this work BETA
Moti Mizrahi (2014). Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):183-197.
Similar books and articles
Moti Mizrahi (2012). Intuition Mongering. The Reasoner 6 (11):169-170.
Moti Mizrahi (2013). More Intuition Mongering. The Reasoner 7 (1):5-6.
John Symons (2008). Intuition and Philosophical Methodology. Axiomathes 18 (1):67-89.
Ernest Sosa (1996). Rational Intuition: Bealer on its Nature and Epistemic Status. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):151--162.
Jack C. Lyons (2009). Perception and Virtue Reliabilism. Acta Analytica 24 (4):249-261.
Thomas Grundmann (2007). The Nature of Rational Intuitions and a Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):69-87.
Max Seeger (2010). Experimental Philosophy and the Twin Earth Intuition. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80:237-244.
Steven D. Hales (2004). Intuition, Revelation, and Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):271 – 295.
Steven D. Hales (2000). The Problem of Intuition. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (2):135-147.
George Bealer (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield. 201-240.
Mark McEvoy (2007). Kitcher, Mathematical Intuition, and Experience. Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2):227-237.
Added to index2011-08-10
Total downloads92 ( #16,923 of 1,679,333 )
Recent downloads (6 months)21 ( #10,461 of 1,679,333 )
How can I increase my downloads?