David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theory and Decision 25 (1):25-78 (1988)
Behaviour norms are considered for decision trees which allow both objective probabilities and uncertain states of the world with unknown probabilities. Terminal nodes have consequences in a given domain. Behaviour is required to be consistent in subtrees. Consequentialist behaviour, by definition, reveals a consequence choice function independent of the structure of the decision tree. It implies that behaviour reveals a revealed preference ordering satisfying both the independence axiom and a novel form of sure-thing principle. Continuous consequentialist behaviour must be expected utility maximizing. Other plausible assumptions then imply additive utilities, subjective probabilities, and Bayes' rule.
|Keywords||Expected utility subjective probability decision trees Bayes' rule consequentialist behaviour|
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H. Orri Stefánsson (2015). Fair Chance and Modal Consequentialism. Economics and Philosophy 31 (3):371-395.
Jonathan Baron (1994). Nonconsequentialist decisions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):1.
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