David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theory and Decision 25 (1):25-78 (1988)
Behaviour norms are considered for decision trees which allow both objective probabilities and uncertain states of the world with unknown probabilities. Terminal nodes have consequences in a given domain. Behaviour is required to be consistent in subtrees. Consequentialist behaviour, by definition, reveals a consequence choice function independent of the structure of the decision tree. It implies that behaviour reveals a revealed preference ordering satisfying both the independence axiom and a novel form of sure-thing principle. Continuous consequentialist behaviour must be expected utility maximizing. Other plausible assumptions then imply additive utilities, subjective probabilities, and Bayes' rule
|Keywords||Expected utility subjective probability decision trees Bayes' rule consequentialist behaviour|
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Citations of this work BETA
Rob van Someren Greve (2013). Objective Consequentialism and Avoidable Imperfections. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):481-492.
Wolfgang Spohn (2012). Reversing 30 Years of Discussion: Why Causal Decision Theorists Should One-Box. Synthese 187 (1):95-122.
Jean Hampton (1994). The Failure of Expected-Utility Theory as a Theory of Reason. Economics and Philosophy 10 (02):195-.
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