David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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History and Theory 47 (2):183–199 (2008)
To date, no satisfactory account of the connection between natural-scientific and historical explanation has been given, and philosophers seem to have largely given up on the problem. This paper is an attempt to resolve this old issue and to sort out and clarify some areas of historical explanation by developing and applying a method that will be called “pragmatic explication” involving the construction of definitions that are justified on pragmatic grounds. Explanations in general can be divided into “dynamic” and “static” explanations, which are those that essentially require relations across time and those that do not, respectively. The problem of assimilating historical explanations concerns dynamic explanation, so a general analysis of dynamic explanation that captures both the structure of natural-scientific and historical explanation is offered. This is done in three stages: In the first stage, pragmatic explication is introduced and compared to other philosophical methods of explication. In the second stage pragmatic explication is used to tie together a series of definitions that are introduced in order to establish an account of explanation. This involves an investigation of the conditions that play the role in historiography that laws and statistical regularities play in the natural sciences. The essay argues that in the natural sciences, as well as in history, the model of explanation presented represents the aims and overarching structure of actual causal explanations offered in those disciplines. In the third stage the system arrived at in the preceding stage is filled in with conditions available to and relevant for historical inquiry. Further, the nature and treatment of causes in history and everyday life are explored and related to the system being proposed. This in turn makes room for a view connecting aspects of historical explanation and what we generally take to be causal relations.
|Keywords||explanation philosophy of history causation|
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References found in this work BETA
Carl G. Hempel (1942). The Function of General Laws in History. Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):35-48.
Philip Kitcher (1981). Explanatory Unification. Philosophy of Science 48 (4):507-531.
Raymond Martin (1981). Beyond Positivism: A Research Program for Philosophy of History. Philosophy of Science 48 (1):112-121.
Paul A. Roth (1999). The Full Hempel. History and Theory 38 (2):249–263.
Michael Scriven (1971). The Logic of Cause. Theory and Decision 2 (1):49-66.
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