David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 171 (3):409 - 417 (2009)
In The Blue Book, Wittgenstein defined a category of uses of “I” which he termed “I”-as-subject, contrasting them with “I”-as-object uses. The hallmark of this category is immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). This article extends Wittgenstein’s characterisation to the case of memory-judgments, discusses the significance of IEM for self-consciousness—developing the idea that having a first-person thought involves thinking about oneself in a distinctive way in which one cannot think of anyone or anything else—and refutes a common objection to the claim that memory-judgments exhibit IEM.
|Keywords||Self-consciousness Memory Wittgenstein “I” Self-identification Immunity to error through misidentification|
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References found in this work BETA
G. E. M. Anscombe (1975). The First Person. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Oxford University Press. 45â65.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
A. Hamilton (1995). A New Look at Personal Identity. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):332-349.
Andy Hamilton (2003). 'Scottish Commonsense' About Memory: A Defence of Thomas Reid's Direct Knowledge Account. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):229-245.
Christoph Hoerl (1999). Memory, Amnesia, and the Past. Mind and Language 14 (2):227-51.
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