Memory and self-consciousness: Immunity to error through misidentification [Book Review]

Synthese 171 (3):409 - 417 (2009)
In The Blue Book, Wittgenstein defined a category of uses of “I” which he termed “I”-as-subject, contrasting them with “I”-as-object uses. The hallmark of this category is immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). This article extends Wittgenstein’s characterisation to the case of memory-judgments, discusses the significance of IEM for self-consciousness—developing the idea that having a first-person thought involves thinking about oneself in a distinctive way in which one cannot think of anyone or anything else—and refutes a common objection to the claim that memory-judgments exhibit IEM.
Keywords Self-consciousness  Memory  Wittgenstein  “I”  Self-identification  Immunity to error through misidentification
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References found in this work BETA
G. E. M. Anscombe (1975). The First Person. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Oxford University Press 45–65.
A. Hamilton (1995). A New Look at Personal Identity. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):332-349.

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