Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Justification

Philosophy Research Archives 10:1-12 (1984)
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Abstract

The author discusses solutions to Moore’s Paradox by Moore and Wittgenstein and then offers one of his own: ‘I believe that P’ and ‘not-P’ can both be true but nonetheless are not epistemically compatible; that is, it is logically impossible simultaneously to have sufficient evidence to justify assertions of each. The author then argues that similar transgressions are committed by other “paradoxical” utterances whose paradoxicality cannot be explained by the Moore or Wittgenstein solutions and also that this provides a technique that can be useful in studying the epistemic requirements for justified assertion.

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Justified Assertion and the Relativity of Knowledge.Robert Hambourger - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (2):241 - 269.

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