Perception, sensation, and non-conceptual content

Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):139-53 (1994)
Some philosophers have argued recently that the content of perception is either entirely or mainly non- conceptual. Much of the motivation for that view derives from theories of information processing, which are a modern version of ancient considerations about the causal processes underlying perception. The paper argues to the contrary that perception is essentially concept- dependent. While perception must have a structure derived from what is purely sensory, and is thereby dependent on processes involving information in the technical sense which Gibson said amounted to structure, the information which perception provides about the world depends on the concepts which we have
Keywords Conception  Content  Epistemology  Perception  Sensation
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