David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):139-53 (1994)
Some philosophers have argued recently that the content of perception is either entirely or mainly non- conceptual. Much of the motivation for that view derives from theories of information processing, which are a modern version of ancient considerations about the causal processes underlying perception. The paper argues to the contrary that perception is essentially concept- dependent. While perception must have a structure derived from what is purely sensory, and is thereby dependent on processes involving information in the technical sense which Gibson said amounted to structure, the information which perception provides about the world depends on the concepts which we have.
|Keywords||Conception Content Epistemology Perception Sensation|
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Carolyn Dicey Jennings (2015). Attention and Perceptual Organization. Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1265-1278.
Josefa Toribio (2007). Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy Compass 2 (3):445–460.
Simone Gozzano (2008). In Defence of Non-Conceptual Content. Axiomathes 18 (1):117-126.
Emmanuel Ola Akintona (2015). The Place of Concept in Human Cognitive Process of Perception: Why the Conceptualists Cannot Be Right? Open Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):96-103.
Emmanuel Ola Akintona (2014). A Critique of Mcdowell’s Demonstrative Thought in the Cognitive Process of Perception. Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):409-415.
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