David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Economics and Philosophy 10 (02):195- (1994)
Expected-utility theory has been a popular and influential theory in philosophy, law, and the social sciences. While its original developers, von Neumann and Morgenstern, presented it as a purely predictive theory useful to the practitioners of economic science, many subsequent theorists, particularly those outside of economics, have come to endorse EU theory as providing us with a representation of reason. But precisely in what sense does EU theory portray reason? And does it do so successfully? There are two strikingly different answers to these questions in the literature. On the one hand, there is the view of people such as David Gauthier that EU theory is an implementation of the idea that reason's only role is instrumental. On the other hand, there is the view suggested by Leonard Savage that the theory is a “formal” and noninstrumental characterization of our reasoning process
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References found in this work BETA
Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen (eds.) (1979). Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. D. Reidel.
Elizabeth Anderson (1993). Value in Ethics and Economics. Harvard University Press.
David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
James Dreier (1993). Structures of Normative Theories. The Monist 76 (1):22-40.
David P. Gauthier (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Raul Hakli, Kaarlo Miller & Raimo Tuomela (2010). Two Kinds of We-Reasoning. Economics and Philosophy 26 (03):291-320.
Chrisoula Andreou (2005). Incommensurable Alternatives and Rational Choice. Ratio 18 (3):249–261.
Janice Richardson (2007). Contemporary Feminist Perspectives on Social Contract Theory. Ratio Juris 20 (3):402-423.
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