The Liar Paradox, Self-Understanding, and Nietzschean Perspectivalism

Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago (2002)
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Abstract

The liar paradox in its simplest form is the following argument. Consider the sentence 'this sentence is false'; call that the "liar sentence". Suppose the liar sentence is true. Then, since it says it is false, the liar sentence is false. So our supposition that it is true was mistaken, and the liar sentence must be false. But that's precisely what the liar sentence says, so it is true after all. The liar sentence is, therefore, both true and false---an absurd result. ;Hans Herzberger has argued that several solutions to the Grelling paradox exhibit a common pattern: the very devices we introduce in order to avoid one version of the paradox are integral components of new versions of the paradox. Herzberger suggests that this is typical of semantic paradox in general. Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of this dissertation examine several possible solutions to the liar---especially appeals to language levels and to contexts---and attempt to locate these possible solutions in Herzberger's pattern. ;There is some reason to think that this pattern is inescapable---that is, that the liar paradox is ultimately unsolvable---so the remaining two chapters of this dissertation explore what follows from the claim that it is unsolvable. Chapter 4 develops an argument from the claim that the liar is unsolvable to the claim that we cannot understand ourselves. Chapter 5, then, attempts to make sense of this circumstance by invoking a Nietzschean view of thinking and truth---perspectivalism, which holds that all thinking concerns interpretation and that there are no uninterpreted facts. Given some perspectivalist assumptions, we can see how it is inevitable that we will be unable to understand ourselves---and how we can nevetherless attain a certain limited kind of understanding. Perspectivalism also recommends a certain intellectual humility: if everything is interpretation, then no view of mine can be a comprehensive and accurate view of the way the world really is. This by itself is not a surprising claim; the surprising claim is that the liar paradox is the basis of it

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