Armstrong and the modal inversion of dispositions

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):452–461 (2005)
Abstract
D. M. Armstrong has objected that the Dispositionalist theory of laws and properties is modally inverted, for it entails that properties are constituted by relations to non-actual possibilia. I contend that, if this objection succeeds against Dispositionalism, then Armstrong's nomic necessitation relation is also modally inverted. This shows that at least one of Armstrong's reasons for preferring a nomic necessitation theory is specious.
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References found in this work BETA
Alexander Bird (1998). Dispositions and Antidotes. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):227-234.
Fred I. Dretske (1977). Laws of Nature. Philosophy of Science 44 (2):248-268.
David Lewis (1997). Finkish Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.

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Citations of this work BETA
Toby Handfield (2005). Lange on Essentialism, Counterfactuals, and Explanation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):81 – 85.
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