David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Until recently, perdurantism has been considered to be incompatible with the presentist ontology of time. However, discussions about presentist theories of perdurance are now surfacing, one of the most prominent arguments for which being Berit Brogaard’s essay: “Presentist Four-Dimensionalism”. In this paper, I examine Brogaard’s argument in contrast to Ted Sider’s arguments for (an Eternalist theory of) the “Stage View”. I then argue for another (and, I think, novel) view of presentist perdurantism, which avoids the problematic consequences that Brogaard’s view faces, and which also successfully solves philosophical puzzles without the difficulties that Sider’s view faces. This view, which I call “Stage View Presentism,” thus seems to be an appealing alternative for presentists who remain impartial to both the endurantist and the worm theories of persistence.
|Keywords||Identity Through Time Presentism|
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