Coherence in epistemology and belief revision

Philosophical Studies 128 (1):93 - 108 (2006)
Abstract
A general theory of coherence is proposed, in which systemic and relational coherence are shown to be interdefinable. When this theory is applied to sets of sentences, it turns out that logical closure obscures the distinctions that are needed for a meaningful analysis of coherence. It is concluded that references to “all beliefs” in coherentist phrases such as “all beliefs support each other” have to be modified so that merely derived beliefs are excluded. Therefore, in order to avoid absurd conclusions, coherentists have to accept a weak version of epistemic priority, that sorts out merely derived beliefs. Furthermore, it is shown that in belief revision theory, coherence cannot be adequately represented by logical closure, but has to be represented separately.
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References found in this work BETA
Daya (1960). Types of Coherence. Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):193-204.
SvenOve Hansson (2000). Coherentist Contraction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (3):315-330.

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