Can Manipulators Mislead Market Observers?
| Abstract | We study experimental markets where privately informed traders exchange simple assets, and where uninformed third parties are asked to forecast the values of these assets, guided only by market prices. Although prices only partially aggregate information, they significantly improve the forecasts of third parties. In a second treatment, a portion of traders are given preferences over the forecasts made by observers. Although we find evidence that these traders attempt to manipulate prices in order to influence the beliefs of observers, we find no evidence that observers make less accurate forecasts as a result | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,709 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Similar books and articlesRobert E. Goodin (2006). The Epistemic Benefi Ts of Multiple Biased Observers. Episteme 3 (3):166-174.
Robert E. Goodin (2006). The Benefits of Multiple Biased Observers. Episteme 3 (3):166-174.
Analytics
Monthly downloads
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
|
Added to index2009-03-15Total downloads3 ( #202,107 of 549,694 )Recent downloads (6 months)0How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
