David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):237-243 (2009)
A definition of pseudoscience is proposed, according to which a statement is pseudoscientific if and only if it (1) pertains to an issue within the domains of science, (2) is not epistemically warranted, and (3) is part of a doctrine whose major proponents try to create the impression that it is epistemically warranted. This approach has the advantage of separating the definition of pseudoscience from the justification of the claim that science represents the most epistemically warranted statements. The definition is used to explain why proponents of widely divergent criteria for the demarcation between science and pseudoscience tend to be in almost complete agreement on the particular demarcations that should presumably be based on these general criteria
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References found in this work BETA
Brian S. Baigrie (1988). Siegel on the Rationality of Science. Philosophy of Science 55 (3):435-441.
Frank Cioffi (1985). Psychoanalysis, Pseudo-Science and Testability. In Gregory Currie & Alan Musgrave (eds.), Popper and the Human Sciences. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 13--44.
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