Decisions under imperfect knowledge: The certainty equivalence theory as an alternative to the Von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of uncertainty

Erkenntnis 20 (3):295 - 328 (1983)
Abstract This paper offers a modified version of the certainty equivalence (CE) theory of utility for uncertain prospects and a new set of axioms as its basis. It shows that the CE and the von Neumann-Morgenstern (NM) approaches to uncertainty are opposite in spirit: The CE approach represents a flight from the world of uncertainty to the rules of certainty while the NM approach represents a flight from the world of certainty to one of uncertainty. The two approaches differ even in their treatment of compound prospects and their actuarially identical simple counterparts.
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