David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Newly emerging neuroscientific evidence has important ramifications for the metaphysics of free will. In light of this new evidence, I examine the two most common notions of Libertarianism. I argue that advocates for both the agent-causation and causal indeterminist models of libertarian free will suppose a misguided depiction of what constitutes a free decision. In order to retain a consistent standpoint, I argue that libertarians must view the conscious decision-making process as one of an Architectural nature. Libertarians suppose (depending on their notion) that humans are either the primary cause of their actions, or that they at least have the option to do otherwise. For either of these claims to be necessarily the case, I argue that libertarians must regard humans as having the ability to create their decisions. This ability is a requirement of the Architectural framework, which I explain in detail. I continue my case against libertarian free will, by demonstrating that the Architectural conception is also mistaken, and that the conscious decision-making process is instead one of an Archaeological nature. In this new paradigm, our conscious minds simply discover decisions, rather than create them. I show that both neuroscientific and philosophical evidence support this new model of conscious decision making and I examine how this Archaeological view of conscious discovery significantly undermines libertarian free will.
|Keywords||Free Will Agent Causation Unconscious|
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