Embodied Minds in Action
Oxford University Press (2009)
| Abstract | In Embodied Minds in Action, Robert Hanna and Michelle Maiese work out a unified treatment of three fundamental philosophical problems: the mind-body problem, the problem of mental causation, and the problem of action. This unified treatment rests on two basic claims. The first is that conscious, intentional minds like ours are essentially embodied. This entails that our minds are necessarily spread throughout our living, organismic bodies and belong to their complete neurobiological constitution. So minds like ours are necessarily alive. The second claim is that essentially embodied minds are self-organizing thermodynamic systems. This entails that our mental lives consist in the possibility and actuality of moving our own living organismic bodies through space and time, by means of our conscious desires. The upshot is that we are essentially minded animals who help to create the natural world through our own agency. This doctrine--the Essential Embodiment Theory--is a truly radical idea which subverts the traditionally opposed and seemingly exhaustive categories of Dualism and Materialism, and offers a new paradigm for contemporary mainstream research in the philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience | |||||||||
| Keywords | Philosophy of mind Cognitive neuroscience Mind and body Causation Act (Philosophy | |||||||||
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| Buy the book | $75.00 new $75.00 direct from Amazon $99.05 used Amazon page | |||||||||
| Call number | BD418.3.H35 2009 | |||||||||
| ISBN(s) | 0199230315 9780199230310 0191552178 9780191552175 | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesWilliam E. S. McNeill (2012). Embodiment and the Perceptual Hypothesis. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):n/a-n/a.
Stevan Harnad (1991). Other Bodies, Other Minds: A Machine Incarnation of an Old Philosophical Problem. 1 (1):43-54.
Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1965). The Embodied Mind. London,: Allen Unwin.
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Søren Overgaard (2006). The Problem of Other Minds: Wittgenstein's Phenomenological Perspective. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):53-73.
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Zoe Drayson (2009). Embodied Cognitive Science and its Implications for Psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (4):329-340.
Katsunori Miyahara (2011). Neo-Pragmatic Intentionality and Enactive Perception: A Compromise Between Extended and Enactive Minds. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):499-519.
Ernest Sosa (1984). Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):271-81.
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