David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Oxford University Press (2009)
In Embodied Minds in Action, Robert Hanna and Michelle Maiese work out a unified treatment of three fundamental philosophical problems: the mind-body problem, the problem of mental causation, and the problem of action. This unified treatment rests on two basic claims. The first is that conscious, intentional minds like ours are essentially embodied. This entails that our minds are necessarily spread throughout our living, organismic bodies and belong to their complete neurobiological constitution. So minds like ours are necessarily alive. The second claim is that essentially embodied minds are self-organizing thermodynamic systems. This entails that our mental lives consist in the possibility and actuality of moving our own living organismic bodies through space and time, by means of our conscious desires. The upshot is that we are essentially minded animals who help to create the natural world through our own agency. This doctrine--the Essential Embodiment Theory--is a truly radical idea which subverts the traditionally opposed and seemingly exhaustive categories of Dualism and Materialism, and offers a new paradigm for contemporary mainstream research in the philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience
|Keywords||Philosophy of mind Cognitive neuroscience Mind and body Causation Act (Philosophy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$47.09 used (53% off) $68.89 new (32% off) $100.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BD418.3.H35 2009|
|ISBN(s)||0199230315 9780199230310 0191552178 9780191552175|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert Hanna (2008). Kantian Non-Conceptualism. Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
Miriam Kyselo & Ezequiel Di Paolo (2015). Locked-in Syndrome: A Challenge for Embodied Cognitive Science. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):517-542.
Carl B. Sachs (2012). Resisting the Disenchantment of Nature: McDowell and the Question of Animal Minds. Inquiry 55 (2):131-147.
Robert Hanna & Monima Chadha (2011). Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):184-223.
Michelle Maiese (2012). Rethinking Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):893-916.
Similar books and articles
William E. S. McNeill (2012). Embodiment and the Perceptual Hypothesis. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):569 - 591.
Stevan Harnad (1991). Other Bodies, Other Minds: A Machine Incarnation of an Old Philosophical Problem. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 1 (1):43-54.
Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1965). The Embodied Mind. London,: Allen Unwin.
Raymond W. Gibbs (2006). Embodiment and Cognitive Science. New York ;Cambridge University Press.
Søren Overgaard (2006). The Problem of Other Minds: Wittgenstein's Phenomenological Perspective. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):53-73.
Thomas W. Polger (2012). Metaphysics of Mind. In Robert Barnard Neil Manson (ed.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics.
Zoe Drayson (2009). Embodied Cognitive Science and its Implications for Psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (4):329-340.
Katsunori Miyahara (2011). Neo-Pragmatic Intentionality and Enactive Perception: A Compromise Between Extended and Enactive Minds. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):499-519.
Ernest Sosa (1984). Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):271-81.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads52 ( #77,669 of 1,789,800 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #420,681 of 1,789,800 )
How can I increase my downloads?