Getting God out of our (modal) business

Sophia 48 (4):379-391 (2009)
Abstract
Some hold that if we can imagine God creating a world in which a particular proposition (p) is true, then we can conclude that p is possible. I argue that such appeals to God can’t provide us with a guide to possibility. For either God’s powers aren’t co-extensive with the possible or they are. And if they are, these appeals either beg the question or court a version of Euthyphro’s Dilemma. Some may argue that such appeals were only intended to prompt us to think broadly about the modal claim at issue. I argue instead that these appeals must be understood as more than mere prompts. For it is these appeals that would, if successful, render the conceivability principle viable.
Keywords God  Conceivability  Possibility  Euthyphro’s Dilemma
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    References found in this work BETA
    Jonathan Bennett (1994). Descartes's Theory of Modality. Philosophical Review 103 (4):639-667.
    Joshua Hoffman & Gary Rosenkrantz (1988). Omnipotence Redux. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):283-301.

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