Inquiry 18 (4):409 – 436 (1975)
|Abstract||The word 'sceptic' usually refers to a theoretical figure whose philosophical importance lies exclusively in his challenge to any attempt to justify the belief in the possibility of knowledge. But the label was once applied to living persons - the so-called Pyrrhonists - whose scepticism encompassed a way of life. Following Sextus Empiricus's portrayal of the Pyrrhonists, Arne Naess has provided comprehensive arguments both in rebuttal of the frequent claims either that scepticism is logically inconsistent or that at least it is impossible to put into practice, and in support of scepticism as a fruitful philosophical attitude. The present essay attempts a critical consolidation of Naess's case for scepticism by drawing more explicitly than he does on his work in empirical semantics. The notion of degrees of preciseness is used to outline a philosophically interesting rationale for the Pyrrhonist's persistent abstention from any act or action that commits him to the truth of a proposition, and also to indicate why possible, or even inevitable lapses on the Pyrrhonist's part need not seriously prejudice either his status as a sceptic or the philosophical value of his sceptical ideal.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Anfinn Stigen (1961). Descriptive Analysis and the Sceptic. Inquiry 4 (1-4):228 – 269.
Lodi Nauta (2006). Lorenzo Valla and Quattrocento Scepticism. Vivarium 44 (s 2-3):375-395.
Jeff Malpas (1994). Self-Knowledge and Scepticism. Erkenntnis 40 (2):165-184.
Wai-hung Wong (2002). The Problem of Insulation. Philosophy 77 (3):349-373.
Anthony Rudd (2008). Natural Doubts. Metaphilosophy 39 (3):305–324.
Damian Caluori (2007). The Scepticism of Francisco Sanchez. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 89 (1):30-46.
Sextus Empiricus (2000). Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists. Clarendon Press.
Arne Naess (1966). Psychological and Social Aspects of Pyrrhonian Scepticism. Inquiry 9 (1-4):301 – 321.
Added to index2009-03-05
Total downloads3 ( #202,056 of 549,370 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,370 )
How can I increase my downloads?