David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):113-126 (2008)
Humean metaphysics is characterized by a rejection of necessary connections between distinct existences. Dispositionalists claim that there are basic causal powers. The existence of such properties is widely held to be incompatible with the Humean rejection of necessary connections. In this paper I present a novel theory of causal powers that vindicates the dispositionalist claim that causal powers are basic, without embracing brute necessary connections. The key assumptions of the theory are that there are natural types of causal processes, and that manifestations of powers are identified with certain kinds of causal processes. From these assumptions, the modal features of powers are explained in terms of internal relations between powers themselves and the process-types in which powers are manifested
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References found in this work BETA
Alexander Bird (1998). Dispositions and Antidotes. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):227-234.
Alexander Bird (2001). Necessarily, Salt Dissolves in Water. Analysis 61 (4):267–274.
Alexander Bird (2005). The Dispositionalist Conception of Laws. Foundations of Science 10 (4):353-70.
Sungho Choi (2003). Improving Bird's Antidotes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):573 – 580.
B. D. Ellis (2001). Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Esfeld (2009). The Modal Nature of Structures in Ontic Structural Realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):179 – 194.
Neil E. Williams (2011). Putting Powers Back on Multi-Track. Philosophia 39 (3):581-595.
Andreas Bartels (2013). Why Metrical Properties Are Not Powers. Synthese 190 (12):2001-2013.
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